Imperial legacy? The EU's Developmental Model and the Crisis of the European Periphery. CES Papers - Open Forum #19, 2013-2014 by Notermans, Ton
ces papers - open forum
2013-2014
CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES
T H E  M I N D A  D E  G U N Z B U R G
A T  H A R V A R D  U N I V E R S I T Y
Imperial legacy?
The EU´s Developmental Model and 
the Crisis of the European Periphery
author: Ton Notermans
CES-
ces papers - open forum # 19
Open Forum CES Paper Series
The Series is designed to present work in progress by current and former Center affiliates and 
papers presented at Center’s seminars and conferences. Any opinions expressed in the papers 
are those of the authors, and not of CES.
  
Editors:
Grzegorz Ekiert and Andrew Martin 
Editorial Board:
Philippe Aghion
Peter Hall
Roberto Foa
Alison Frank
Torben Iverson
Maya Jasanoff
Jytte Klausen
Michele Lamont
Mary Lewis
Michael Rosen
Vivien Schmidt
Kathleen Thelen
Daniel Ziblatt
Kathrin Zippel
ABSTRACT
1ces papers - open forum # 19
The high hopes for rapid convergence of Eastern and Southern EU member states are increasingly being disappointed. 
With the onset of the Eurocrisis convergence has given way to divergence in the southern members, and many Eastern 
members have made little headway in closing the development gap. The EU´s performance compares unfavourably with 
East Asian success cases as well as with Western Europe´s own rapid catch-up to the USA after 1945. Historical experi-
ence indicates that successful catch up requires that less-developed economies to some extent are allowed to free-ride on 
an open international economic order. However, the EU´s model is based on the principle of a level-playing field, which 
militates against such a form of economic integration. The EU´s developmental model thus contrasts with the various 
strategies that have enabled successful catch up of industrial latecomers. Instead the EU´s current approach is more and 
more reminiscent of the relations between the pre-1945 European empires and their dependent territories. One reason for 
this unfortunate historical continuity is that the EU appears to have become entangled in its own myths. In the EU´s own 
interpretation, European integration is a peace project designed to overcome the almost continuous warfare that character-
ised the Westphalian system. As the sovereign state is identified as the root cause of all evil, any project to curtail its room 
of manoeuvre must ultimately benefit the common good. Yet, the existence of a Westphalian system of nation states is a 
myth. Empires and not states were the dominant actors in the international system for at least the last three centuries. If 
anything, the dawn of the age of the sovereign state in Western Europe occurred after 1945 with the disintegration of the 
colonial empires and thus historically coincided with the birth of European integration.
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Imperial legacy?
The EU´s Developmental Mod-
el and the Crisis of the Euro-
pean Periphery
1. Introduction 
The Eastern and Southern enlargements of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) gave rise to strong hopes for a rapid 
convergence of the new members towards the per 
capita GDP levels of the North-Western core coun-
tries. Increasingly, these hopes are being disappoint-
ed. With the onset of the Eurocrisis in 2010 conver-
gence has given way to divergence in the southern 
member states as especially the countries that are 
receiving EU/IMF assistance are experiencing a dra-
matic decline in their GDP. More than twenty years 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Empire many of 
the Eastern member states of the EU have made lit-
tle headway despite increasing prosperity. Per capita 
GDP measured as a percentage of the German level 
in Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania has barely made 
any progress at all since 1991. In Poland and Estonia 
instead, convergence takes place at such a slow speed 
that it would take far over a century to complete it. 
The EU thus compares unfavourably to the trajecto-
ries of the Asian success cases such as 19th and 20th 
century Japan and post WW2 South Korea, Singa-
pore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Indeed the current 
trajectory also compares unfavourably to Western 
Europe´s own rapid catch-up to the USA after 1945.
Given Europe´s disappointing performance, there is 
a need to rethink the European model of develop-
ment. Historical experience seems to indicate that 
successful catch-up requires an activist developmen-
tal state which helps create comparative advantage 
and to that extent temporarily discriminates against 
foreign competitors in favour of nascent domestic 
firms. Put differently, successful catch up requires 
that less-developed economies to some extent are 
allowed to free-ride on an open international eco-
nomic order.
A necessary – but by no means sufficient – condi-
tion for successful catch-up within the framework 
of the EU would thus be that European integration 
incorporates such possibilities for free-riding by less 
developed members in its developmental model. In-
stead, the EU´s model is based on the principle of a 
level-playing field in which discrimination is consid-
ered an unfair practice. Although already included 
in the Rome Treaties, it was only with the Single Eu-
ropean Act (SEA) of 1986, the deregulation of cross-
border capital flows since 1998, the agreement on 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) followed by 
the creation of the single market in financial services 
and the strengthening of competition policy since the 
1980s that the notion of “level-playing field” came to 
dominate the EU´s developmental model. Accord-
ingly, that model increasingly contrasts with the vari-
ous strategies that have enabled successful catch up 
of industrial latecomers. Instead the EU´s approach, 
both in terms of mechanism and outcomes is more 
and more reminiscent of the relations between the 
pre-1945 European empires and their dependent ter-
ritories.
One reason for this unfortunate historical continuity 
is that the EU appears to have become entangled in 
its own myths. The official view sees integration as a 
peace project designed to overcome three centuries 
of almost continuous war in the Westphalian system 
of sovereign (nation) states. As the sovereign state is 
identified as the root cause of all evil, any project to 
curtail its room of manoeuvre must ultimately seem 
to the benefit of the common good. Yet, the existence 
of a Westphalian system of nation states is a myth. 
Empires and not states were the dominant actors in 
the international system for at least the last three cen-
turies. As its imperial legacy has disappeared from 
view, so has the fact that, European empires failed 
dismally in their self-proclaimed task of propelling 
their dependent territories to prosperity. As a result 
of this historical blind spot the EU´s hope of becom-
ing a “model power” for the rest of the world seems 
vain. Rather than marking the return to the inter-
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First, state boundaries were precisely defined replac-
ing the medieval system of frequently overlapping 
territories. Secondly, within these borders states en-
joyed absolute sovereignty. Thirdly, the principle of 
Westphalian sovereignty implied acceptance of the 
principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs 
of other states.
Historical research has not been kind to the hypoth-
esis of a Westphalian system. One line of criticism fo-
cuses on the account of the treaties that has entered 
most International Relations texts. The treaties as 
such in no way were the watershed they are depicted 
to have been. Some features of the Westphalian sys-
tem existed prior to it and others came into being only 
later. (Durchhardt 1999:308). The principle of cuius 
regio, eius religio was abolished instead of established 
by the treaties (Osiander 2002: 272). Nor did the trea-
ties enshrine the principle of inviolable Westphalian 
sovereignty as the non-German signatories, France 
and Sweden, reserved the right to intervene on the 
territory of the Holy Roman Empire of German Na-
tion (Winckler 2009: 125-6).
More relevant for the current purpose, is the fact 
that violation of Westphalian sovereignty was and 
remained the norm rather than the exception (Kras-
ner 1999). The main reason for this was that power 
disparities between political units made empires and 
not states the dominant political actors. As John Dar-
win (2007: 23) has expressed it elegantly: “Indeed, the 
difficulty of forming autonomous states on an eth-
nic basis, against the gravitational pull of cultural or 
economic attraction (as well as disparities of military 
force), has been so great that empire (where differ-
ent ethnic communities fall under a common ruler) 
has been the default mode of political organization 
throughout most of history. Imperial power has usu-
ally been the rule of the world.”  (See also Osterham-
mel 2009 Ch. 8; Tilly 1997: 2).
Empires, in contrast to nation states do not derive 
legitimacy from a common national identity but 
are multi-ethnic constructs with a more or less pro-
national prestige it enjoyed during the 19th century, 
Europe´s new empire may rather mark the last phase 
of its international decline.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section two argues that if there ever was an age of the 
nation state in Western Europe it coincided with its 
alleged demise after 1945. Section three reviews the 
obstacles to convergence in the age of empires. Sec-
tion 4 argues that whereas the successful catch-up of 
West European economies after 1945 was predicated 
on a heavily interventionist state, the developmental 
model the EU applies to its periphery is very much 
the opposite. Section five concludes by arguing that, 
at least in the short to medium term, the prospects 
for solving the EU´s crisis are dim. Because competi-
tiveness has replaced comparative advantage as the 
alleged key to success in the global economy, the EU 
has turned economic development into a zero-sum 
game such that successful catch-up by the periphery 
will almost inevitably be interpreted as a threat by the 
core states. 
2.When was the Westphalian System of Sovereign 
States?
European integration is commonly interpreted as a 
breath-taking new departure, coming as it did after 
the three-century-long reign of the Westphalian sys-
tem in which states jealously guarded the absolute 
sovereignty they enjoyed within their clearly defined 
borders while trying to increase their power by means 
of warfare. The beginning of European integration 
hence appears as a Stunde Null; an entry unto new 
and uncharted territory with the implication that the 
past can provide little guidance to the future other 
than that a failure to encroach on the prerogatives 
of the members states in favour of supranationalism 
will doom Europe.
The Westphalian system takes its name from the 
Peace Treaty of 1648 that ended the thirty years war. 
The international system it is said to have ushered 
in differed in three respects from what went before. 
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nounced hierarchical order between the various ter-
ritories that constitute it. Empires do not have pre-
cisely defined borders, because, as was often the case 
with European colonial empires, on their frontiers 
they met grey zones of uncertain political belonging. 
Finally empires generally lay claim to authority be-
yond their borders, through such constructs as infor-
mal empire and zones of influence.
European empire building had started with Vasco Da 
Gama’s rounding of the Cape in 1498 and Columbus’ 
voyages to the Americas, which would result in Por-
tugal, Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands 
each acquiring vast overseas possessions. But the 
empires of the Atlantic powers were by no means the 
only ones. After 1480 the Muscovite Rus commenced 
an unrelenting expansion that eventually resulted in 
an empire spanning almost all the length of Eurasia. 
The conquest of Constantinople in May of 1453 lay 
the foundations of the Ottoman Empire, which con-
trolled the Balkans, Anatolia, the modern Middle East 
and most of North Africa at the height of its power.
To the north-west of the Ottoman Empire, substan-
tial areas from modern-day Ukraine and Poland, 
the northern Balkans, Bohemia and Northern Italy 
formed part of the Austro- Hungarian empire. Fur-
ther to the North lay Prussia, no doubt the least of the 
European empires until well into the 19th century. Its 
rise dated from the conquest of Silesia in 1740, one 
of Austro-Hungary’s richest provinces. Almost an-
nihilated by Napoleon, it emerged from the peace of 
1815 with substantially expanded possessions in the 
Rhineland. Apart from Scandinavia, where Sweden 
largely had to abandon its imperial ambition on the 
continent by the 18th century, paradoxically only the 
non-Prussian parts of the misnamed Holy Roman 
Empire of German Nation, Switzerland and parts of 
Northern Italy were governed by political units that 
were both too small and internally too homogeneous 
to be classified as empires.
Nor would it seem correct to locate the start of the 
age of the nation-state in the 19th century. Also in 
this case historical research has not been able to un-
earth much evidence for the hypothesis that in 19th 
century Europe organic national communities united 
by a strong common identity successfully managed 
to overcome imperial rule. Instead 19th century na-
tionalism appears primarily an elite driven-strategy 
with only limited success (Bayly 2004: 205; Gellner 
1981, Hobsbawm 1992, Tilly 1994). For local elites, 
nationalism held out the lucrative prospect of gaining 
control of the monopoly to tax, but it was tempered 
by the improbability of survival as an independent 
state in a world of empires.
19th century Europe witnessed the rise of only eight 
new states. Five of them had previously been part of 
the Ottoman Empire (Greece 1832, Romania 1856, 
Montenegro 1860, Serbia and Bulgaria 1878). The 
remaining three states were Belgium, Germany and 
Italy. Belgium was created in 1830 after having been 
part of the Netherlands for 15 years. Italy was united 
in stages between May 1859 and September 1870. 
Germany was unified under Prussian leadership after 
the war of 1870-71 against France.
Whether and when new states did emerge had little 
to do with the strength of nationalist movements but 
much more with great power politics (Davies 1997: 
815). The Balkan states including Greece owed their 
existence to a common British, French and Russian 
interest in weakening the Ottoman Empire. Not sur-
prisingly, these new states did not enjoy Westphalian 
sovereignty but essentially exchanged formal incor-
poration into an empire for membership in the infor-
mal empires of France and Britain.
Prussia very likely would not have succeeded in uni-
fying Germany against the wishes of Austria if the 
Crimean war had not broken up the Austro Rus-
sian alliance. Likewise Italian independence would 
have been impossible without French support aimed 
at weakening the Austrian Empire and without the 
Prussian-French war that toppled Napoleon III 
and allowed the Italian government to seize the pa-
pal states (Winckler 2009: 812). The Belgian revolt 
against the Netherlands would hardly have succeeded 
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without the support of French troops and British dip-
lomats, as well as the refusal of Prussia and Austria to 
side with Czar Nicolas I who was eager to intervene 
on the side of the Dutch king (Winckler 2009: 516-7).
Unlike the Balkan states, Belgium, Germany and 
Italy could mount a stronger claim to Westphalian 
sovereignty, but this exactly defined their anomalous 
position as states without dependent territories. Bel-
gium overcame this anomaly when its king managed 
to convince the participants of the 1885 Berlin Con-
gress to grant him the lion’s share of the Congo basin. 
German foreign policy increasingly came to focus 
on acquiring imperial possessions, especially after 
Chancellor Bismarck´s resignation in 1890. Italy was 
soon to direct its attention towards northern Africa. 
Having lost its overseas territories at the end of World 
War 1, the German conviction, shared equally in Ja-
pan, that a densely populated nation-state heavily de-
pendent on trade would hardly be able to defend its 
independence in a world of empires became one of 
the main causes leading to World War 2; particularly 
after the Great Depression when many European na-
tions were tempted to withdraw behind the protective 
walls of their empires.
The disintegration of the Ottoman and Habsburg 
Empires and President Wilson’s insistence on the 
nationality principle for redrawing borders did cre-
ate a host of new nation states, while simultaneously 
extending the French and British (informal) empires 
in the middle east. Yet, for Eastern and Southern Eu-
ropean nations independence was short-lived as they 
were gradually drawn into Germany’s informal em-
pire followed by inclusion in its formal empire, again 
to be exchanged for a somewhat longer lasting inclu-
sion in the Soviet Empire.
At best, one could argue that the nation state became 
the prevalent form of political organisation in West-
ern Europe only after 1945. Decolonisation reduced 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Italy from empires to nation states. The defeated 
Germany had lost its Eastern Empire and a signifi-
cant chunk of its own territory to the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, as a result of the combined effects of the 
Great Depression and War, international economic 
relations remained far more regulated than they had 
been before 1914 and national governments thus ex-
erted a much strengthened authority over their own 
territory. Accordingly, the age of the nation-state co-
incided with its alleged demise at the hands of Euro-
pean Integration.
Moreover, since its inception in 1958 the EU (EEC) 
gradually acquired all the salient attributes of an Em-
pire (Zielonka 2006; Anderson 2007:19). It does not 
derive legitimacy from a common national identity, 
but is a “multi-ethnic conglomerate held together 
by transnational organizational and cultural ties,” to 
use Deepak Lal’s (2003: 29) definition of empire. Like 
an empire, the EU has fuzzy borders and multiple 
power centres. Not being a governance structure for 
a clearly delineated and easily recognisable national-
ity, the question of where the natural borders of the 
EU lie can only have more or less arbitrary answers. 
Like empires, the EU reaches beyond its borders. The 
informal empire of the 19th century finds its corol-
lary in the EU’s various neighbourhood programmes, 
which seriously compromise the sovereignty of these 
states (Zielonka 2008).
Of course, the mechanism and forms of this new su-
pranational construct were novel; but then again, this 
equally applied to the succession of different empires 
that had populated the globe in earlier times. With 
some exceptions, smaller entities were often force-
fully incorporated into Europe´s pre-1945 empires. 
Post-1945 enlargement of the EU functioned accord-
ing to a fundamentally different principle, especially 
since the 1993 EU Copenhagen summit when strict 
eligibility criteria were set for new entrants. Yet, this 
different mechanism of enlargement does not suffice 
to make the EU an entity sui generis.   The pre-1945 
empires could not have survived for as long as they 
did without being able to count on the cooperation 
of local elites that perceived clear benefits from the 
arrangement (Hobsbawm 2008: 79-80). Essentially, 
what held those empires together was that they pro-
 19
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vided both political and economic security to the 
core and held out the promise of political and eco-
nomic modernization to the periphery. In important 
respect, the motives that drove European integration 
were thus similar to the gravitational pull that al-
lowed empires to overcome the centrifugal forces of 
nationalism.
After having lost its Indonesian colony, the Dutch 
government expected economic catastrophe and ea-
gerly looked to gain better access to European mar-
kets. Much the same held true for West Germany 
which had seen its traditional trade relations with the 
East cut off. In addition, of course, integration with 
its European neighbours was a necessary condition 
for Germany to regain its sovereignty. Britain’s initial 
refusal to join the Common Market had much to do 
with a mistaken belief in the continuing strength of 
its empire.
For France, much of the attractiveness of European 
integration derived from the possibility to undo at 
least some of the radical drop in status it had experi-
enced as a result of the Second World War. With Ger-
many unable to lead, integration held out the promise 
of increasing France´s standing in the world by plac-
ing it at the head of a European block. Moreover, inte-
gration also helped France to hold on to what was left 
of its empire. Robert Schuman may have presented 
the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) as 
a means to make war between Germany and France 
impossible, but securing German coal for its steel 
industry certainly helped France continue its colo-
nial wars. In addition, part of the concessions France 
obtained for its agreement to the Common Market 
consisted in EEC financial support for the cost of the 
remaining French empire. 
For the countries that joined the EU in the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements, prosperity and security from a 
possible reawakening of Russian appetites provided 
the crucial motives for relinquishing part of their 
sovereignty almost the moment they had regained it. 
Similarly for what is now the southern periphery of 
the Eurozone, probably the most decisive argument 
in favour of EU membership was economic moderni-
sation.
Hence, the emergence of European integration, in a 
sense, may be considered business as usual as it con-
firmed that Westphalian states rarely are viable enti-
ties in the international system. When Jean Monnet 
was voicing his conviction that the resources of the 
nation states no longer sufficed (Bache & George 
2006:95), he was not so much expressing a radically 
new view but a rather widespread conviction that em-
pire was necessary for prosperity.
Blotting out Europe´s imperial past in favour of an 
imaginary Westphalian system, however, serves to 
seriously constrain the understanding of European 
integration. First, as Jan Zielonka (2006), and others. 
(Beck & Grande 2010, Colomer 2007) have pointed 
out, awareness of the historical role of empires helps 
to discern alternative future trajectories beyond the 
unhelpful dichotomy of a United States of Europe 
versus the dominance of the nation state. Secondly, 
by postulating that the dominance of (nation) states 
is coterminous with warfare, successful integration 
becomes coterminous with more supranationalism 
and a-priori excludes the possibility that (certain 
forms of) suprantionalism may in fact be inimical to 
successful integration. Third, seeing the Westphalian 
state as the historical standard, European integration 
becomes a construct sui generis, which means that 
Europe’s past cannot hold many useful lessons.
In contrast, the realisation that “supranational” em-
pires have traditionally been the dominant actors in 
international relations, almost inevitably invites com-
parison of the EU to its imperial predecessors. How 
does the EU differ from these previous supranational 
constructs? What where the strengths and weakness-
es of such Empires and how can the former be ampli-
fied and the latter avoided in contemporary Europe?
19
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3. Economic Convergence in the Age of European 
Empires
The main weakness of the European empires, no 
doubt, was the failure to develop their peripheral ar-
eas. Although generally justified in terms of a mis-
sion to bring civilisation and prosperity to its colo-
nies, European overseas imperialism coincided with 
a “Great Divergence” in per capita GDP levels in the 
world economy. Europe did already have a head-start 
at the beginning of the 16th century, but at that point, 
according to the estimates of Angus Maddison, Asian 
per capita GDP still stood at roughly 74% of the West 
European level. By 1950 it had fallen to about 14% 
(Table 1). 
The official justification underlying 19th century 
European attitudes towards development of the pe-
riphery, as well as much of current thinking, was that 
free trade, free capital movements and gold standard 
membership would suffice to bring about conver-
gence. European industrialisation did indeed cre-
ate buoyant markets for the producers of primary 
goods in the periphery and a stream of foreign in-
vestment (mainly British) that helped to create the 
necessary infrastructure for this trade. Especially 
from the 1870s to 1914 solid export growth allowed 
many primary producers to record rates of GDP 
growth comparable to those in the core countries 
(Findlay & O´Rourke 2007: 414-15). But specialisa-
tion in primary products did not lay the foundations 
for sustained convergence as spectacularly demon-
strated by, for example Argentina whose per capita 
GDP in 1913 was on a par with that of the indus-
trialised countries (della Paolera & Taylor 2001: 7). 
What was needed for sustained convergence was di-
versification and especially a domestic manufactur-
ing base (Williamson 2006: 147), and this in turn 
required high levels of investment, i.e. strong invest-
ment demand had to be matched by an ample sup-
ply of investment funds. As argued in early work by 
Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), and subsequently 
confirmed by more recent research (Amsden 2004; 
Chang 2003; Lin & Chang 2009; Reinert 2007; Ro-
drik 2007), late development of manufacturing de-
pended critically on active state involvement. Partly 
due to economies of scale, underdeveloped systems 
of investment finance, long learning curves in manu-
facturing, coordination problems due the imperfect 
tradeability of intermediate goods and the absence 
of a domestic entrepreneurial class, less-developed 
economies could not hope to catch-up by relying en-
tirely on the market mechanisms.
As first argued by Alexander Hamilton (1791) and 
later popularised and diffused in Europe by Friedrich 
1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950
Total Western Europe 774 894 1024 1232 1974 3473 4594
Total Western Offshoots 400 400 473 1201 2431 5257 9288
Total Latin America 416 437 529 665 698 1511 2554
Japan 500 520 570 669 737 1387 1926
Total Asia (excluding Japan) 572 575 571 575 543 640 635
Africa 400 400 400 418 444 585 852
Table 1: World GDP per Capita since 1500 AD
(1990 international $)
Source. Maddison 2001: 264
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List (1885), one upshot of this view was that nascent 
industries required tariff protection. Although such 
infant industry tariffs came to be widely employed in 
the periphery, especially since the interwar period, 
the strong focus on tariffs was misplaced. Tariffs were 
one and not even a necessary element in a broader 
strategy of late industrialisation. The use of tariffs 
alone would suffice only if a nascent industry was al-
ready present or could be assumed to spring up auto-
matically in response to changed price signals. Lack 
of industrial experience and the many coordination 
problems involved in creating a diversified manu-
facturing base from scratch implied that such was 
not necessarily the case. Late industrialisation thus 
required a broader strategy of what (Chang 2003) 
has called Industrial, Technology and Trade policies 
(ITT). ITT strategies in general comprise a mix of 
horizontal and vertical state aid, such as upgrading 
of the education system and the transport infrastruc-
ture, promotion of research & development, model 
factories, state owned companies, subsidies to prior-
ity sectors as well as selective credit allocation, prefer-
ential access to foreign exchange, dual exchange rates 
or undervalued currencies.
At first sight, interference with open capital markets 
and the rejection of fixed exchange rates, the other 
pillars of classic European liberalism, might not seem 
to be in the interest of convergence. Foreign invest-
ment, of course would allow the periphery to accu-
mulate capital at a much faster rate than by relying on 
domestic savings alone. Moreover, there is substantial 
evidence that adherence to the Gold Standard low-
ered borrowing costs (Obstfeld & Taylor 2003) and 
promoted trade (Flandreau & Maurel 2005). Yet, fi-
nancial and monetary integration often turned out to 
be a two-edged sword. Exchange rate manipulation 
could effectively complement or substitute tariffs in 
promoting domestic manufacturing. Indeed, India 
was placed on the Gold Standard by the British ad-
ministration in 1892 mainly because its depreciating 
silver standard was seen to confer an unfair advantage 
on its exports. The advantages of lower borrowing 
costs could be easily offset by the destabilising effects 
of a speculative overexpansion of credit followed by a 
sudden drying up of foreign funds. The costs would 
multiply if default and devaluation were eschewed in 
such a credit crisis in favour of austerity and defence 
of the gold parity (McLean 2006). Indeed, many ana-
lysts of the pre 19-14 Gold Standard concluded that it 
served to destabilise peripheral members (Galarotti 
1995:37-41; Notermans 2012). Finally, adherence to 
the Gold Standard in times of relative gold scarcity 
would inhibit the ability of monetary policy to pro-
mote an ample supply of domestic investment funds 
necessary for sustained growth.
As state-led development strategies proved necessary 
for catch-up, the relation of peripheral countries to 
the metropolitan areas was of crucial importance. 
Colonies were most restrained in this respect as they 
were not permitted significant deviations from the 
free trade doctrine and colonial administration did 
not count industrial development amongst their pri-
orities. As Josiah Child (Child 1751), director of the 
British East India Company, had already set out in 
1751, European nations should assign their colonies 
to the role of suppliers of raw materials and consum-
ers of European goods and investment while prevent-
ing them from turning into competitors for Euro-
pean manufactures. As a result none of the colonies 
managed to catch up under European rule and India, 
which clearly was technologically more advanced 
than Britain in the crucial area of textiles as late as the 
beginning of the 19th century, experienced substan-
tial de-industrialisation under British rule (Ferguson 
2004: 369).
Partly as a reaction to the revolt of the American colo-
nies in the late 18th century, the British dominions of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand, enjoyed much 
more autonomy. Home Rule, was granted to all of 
them early on, and this included the right to set their 
own tariffs; a right which they used liberally in an ef-
fort to promote their own industrialisation (Findlay 
& O´Rourke 2007: 395). Moreover, the Dominions 
benefitted from a continuous inflow of British and 
Irish immigrants which brought with them the skills 
19
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and entrepreneurial experience most colonies were 
lacking, while Australia, in addition received large 
amounts of British subsidies in the first decades after 
the founding of a British penal colony there in 1788 
(Boot 1998). As a result the British dominions, along-
side the breakaway colony of the USA were the only 
countries to successfully close the development gap 
with Europe before Japan embarked on its ascent in 
1868.
Although they were less constrained than the colo-
nies, the techniques of informal imperialism meant 
that even formally independent states might enjoy 
less autonomy in some crucial policy areas than the 
dominions in the British system (Gallagher & Rob-
inson 1953). Especially since the second half of the 
19th century European colonial powers employed 
such techniques to open markets, secure supplies of 
raw materials and protect its investors from sovereign 
default. Japan, China, the Ottoman Empire and a host 
of other countries signed so-called unequal treaties 
that seriously circumscribed their sovereignty; espe-
cially with respect to tariffs, market access and trade. 
(Findlay & O’Rourke 2007: 400-402). Ottoman tar-
iff autonomy, for example had already been largely 
lost in 1838 in exchange for British support against 
Egypt’s Mehmed Ali Pasha, and was never recovered.
Sovereign default repeatedly served as another route 
through which European powers constrained the 
economic policy options of independent territories 
(Fishlow 1985: 403-4). The 1832 treaty recognising 
Greek independence, for example, limited its fiscal au-
tonomy in the interest of debt service. Not unlike the 
proposals floated by Merkel and Sarkozy in February 
of 2012, western creditors placed fiscal policies under 
the control of the International Finance Commission 
(IFC) when the country proved unable to service its 
debt after defeat in the war with the Ottoman Em-
pire in 1897. The IFC controlled a large part of public 
revenues and had a veto on the issuing of new debt. 
(Andreopoulos 1988; Lazaretou 2004). In response to 
the Ottoman default of 1875, Britain and France es-
tablished the Public Debt Council which effectively 
placed the management of Ottoman public finances 
into their hands (Anderson 1964, Pamuk 1987). Sim-
ilar devices were used in the Balkans (Tooze & Ivanov 
2011). In Egypt, where Anglo-French control of pub-
lic revenues after the sovereign default of 1875 pro-
voked a nationalist backlash, the British instead saw 
it necessary in 1882 to proceed from informal empire 
to occupation.
But a considerable degree of autonomy from the Eu-
ropean empires was a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for successful development because auton-
omy neither implied a willingness to pursue such pol-
icies nor the presence of a state apparatus that could 
prevent such a strategy from degenerating into pure 
rent-seeking. In 19th century agricultural exporters 
such as Argentina and Brazil as well as the confed-
erate US states, policies of forced industrialisation 
could not necessarily command political support, 
particularly in times of improving terms of trade. The 
production of export crops by means of a latifundia 
system created a strong interest of the political elites 
in free trade, exchanging agricultural exports for 
manufactured imports. When many Latin American 
countries did embark on an inward looking develop-
ment policy since the Great Depression serious prob-
lems of crony capitalism developed. The constellation 
was much the opposite in the Northern states of the 
USA, which became the most successful early case of 
catch-up after they had broken away from the Brit-
ish Empire in the late 18th century and embarked on 
highly protectionist trade policies.
In the end, outside of the European offshoots the con-
ditions for successful convergence before 1945 were 
only met in Japan. The threat of colonisation and 
the absence of concentrated primary good export-
ers ensured the political primacy for a programme 
of forced industrialisation after 1868. Japan did not 
enjoy tariff autonomy between 1858 and 1911 but 
this handicap was compensated for by extensive use 
of horizontal and vertical state aids. An exceptionally 
centralised and efficient state apparatus insured that 
such strategies could be implemented efficiently. The 
central government´s ability to raise substantial tax 
19
ces papers - open forum # 10
revenues made this strategy invulnerable to exces-
sive foreign indebtedness. Indeed, the example of the 
British occupation of Egypt in 1882 provided a strong 
incentive in the first decades of the Meiji era to avoid 
significant foreign public indebtedness (Jansen 2000: 
373), and for similar reasons private foreign direct in-
vestment was discouraged. Finally, Japan joined the 
Gold Standard only in 1897, a time when silver-based 
currencies were appreciating (Mitchener, Shizume & 
Weidenmier 2010: 29).
4.The Crisis of the European Periphery
The post-1945 history of Western Europe itself con-
firms that catch-up required an interventionist state 
and the active management of international econom-
ic relations. After two world wars and one Great De-
pression, Western Europe´s lead over the rest of the 
world by 1945 had been lost. In 1950 French, Ger-
man and Italian per capita GDP stood at 55%, 41% 
and 37%, respectively, of the US level (Maddison 
2001: 264). Economic catch-up then became the most 
pressing priority of West European governments.
The initial American plans for the post-war order 
might have hindered convergence as they envisaged 
free trade, fixed exchange rates, current account con-
vertibility and the end of European imperial prefer-
ences; a combination which would have allowed the 
US to exploit its economic superiority to the full. 
With the emergence of the cold war, that programme 
was unceremoniously scrapped in favour of the Mar-
shall plan, a massive devaluation of almost all West 
European currencies against the Dollar in 1949, and 
support for closer economic cooperation which al-
lowed Europe to discriminate against US trade.
Hence it was with US support that Western Europe 
tackled the task of catch-up on the basis of a further 
substantial increase in the role of public authorities 
in economic management. In Britain, the Labour 
government of Clement Attlee, elected in late 1945, 
embarked on a programme of nationalisation of stra-
tegic industries. The French government, and to a 
lesser extent the Dutch one, instituted an ambitious 
programme of indicative planning in what was to 
become a highly successful policy of forced indus-
trialisation. Tax policy in virtually all countries was 
designed to promote industrial investment. Similarly, 
almost all governments kept interest rates low while 
employing selective credit rationing in order to chan-
nel investment funds to priority sectors and keep in-
flationary pressures arising from the monetary over-
hang at bay. Public involvement in wage-bargaining 
increased significantly with a view to keeping infla-
tion down and promoting the competitiveness of 
manufacturing, the extreme case being the Nether-
lands where wages were de facto set by the govern-
ment until well into the 1960s. 
Highly cautious liberalisation of external economic 
relations was part and parcel of this strategy. No at-
tempt was made to resurrect the Gold Standard. Con-
trary to what had been envisaged at Bretton Woods 
in 1944, currencies remained inconvertible until 
late December 1958 and parity adjustment were fre-
quently used afterwards to correct external imbalanc-
es. Convertibility for capital account transactions was 
introduced in all EU member states only after Coun-
cil Directive 361 of 1988. Trade liberalisation made 
little headway until the mid-1950s when the post-war 
boom was well under way, and even then, introduc-
tion of a customs union for goods with a common 
external tariff between only six members meant that 
competition from non-members was kept at bay.
By the 1980s the gap with the USA had largely been 
closed, but that same decade saw the beginnings of a 
widening gap within the EU as a result of the Mediter-
ranean (1981, 1986) and Eastern enlargements (2004, 
2007, 2013). In 2012 the per capita GDP of the richest 
member, Luxembourg was more than 15 times that of 
Bulgaria, the poorest members, while the per capita 
GDP of Denmark, the second richest country - still 
exceeded the Bulgarian one by more than 8 times. 
The convergence performance of the EU´s own pe-
riphery is disappointing compared both to western 
Europe´s own performance after 1945 as well as Ja-
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pan and the so-called four Asian tigers. Post-1945 
Japan managed to catch up in a little over three de-
cades, Western Europe took roughly four decades, 
and South-Korea, which started from a much more 
unfavourable position in 1955 than the new member 
states, did so in about five decades.
Table 2 shows per capita GDP as a percentage of the 
German level of the GIIPS countries in 2011 and 
the year of their accession. Greece and Italy actually 
are poorer compared to Germany than they were in 
1981 and 1970, respectively. In the 27 years that have 
elapsed since their accession, Portugal and Spain have 
only made very modest progress. The only exception 
to this pattern is Ireland whose speed in catching up 
is reminiscent of Japan and South- Korea. 
With the exception of Poland and the Slovak Repub-
lic, the eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries that joined in 2004 have made very little 
progress at all. While one should not expect miracles 
in a span of seven years, the picture does not improve 
much when comparing the 2011 level with 1991. Es-
tonia and Poland have made notable progress, but it 
still took Estonia two decades to reduce the gap to 
Germany by about 10 percentage points, and at that 
speed it would take more than a century to close 
the gap. Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania instead have 
made no progress at all.
Paradoxically, perhaps, the EU´s strategy for pro-
moting economic convergence did not build on the 
lessons of empire and post-1945 success. The disap-
pointing performance of the core countries itself 
provides the main explanation. Despite the Com-
mission’s belief that the various step towards further 
integration, from the SEA to EMU and enlargement, 
would boost growth, and notwithstanding the Lisbon 
Strategy´s high-flying ambition to become “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world” by 2010, overall GDP growth rates in 
the Union have been disappointing compared to the 
post-war decades while mass-unemployment has be-
come an endemic problem. Against this background 
competitiveness came to be seen as the key to growth 
with the EU de facto embracing a theory of absolute 
advantage. In Ricardo´s classic focus on static com-
parative advantage the lower cost structures of pe-
ripheral countries are not a threat to more developed 
economies as they reflect the overall lower productiv-
ity levels of these countries. The heterodox focus on 
dynamic comparative advantage, in addition, derives 
a need for an activist developmental state. Instead, in 
the EU´s focus on competitiveness, both features are 
 
Table 2: GIIPS GDP Per Capita as a 
Percentage of the German Level 
  
Per Capita GDP 
(%) 
Year of 
Accession
Year of 
Accession 2011 
Greece 1981 58.82 47.73
Ireland 1973 61.44 105.76
Italy  19701 79.88 72.26
Portugal 1986 39.60 44.08
Spain 1986 54.36 58.87
Notes: 1, earliest year of data availability. 
Source: Calculated on the basis of GDP/Capita in 
constant 2000 US$, World Bank, World Development 
Indicators Database. 
 
19
 
 
Table 3: CEE GDP Per Capita as % of 
German Level 
1991 2004 2011 
Czech Republic 23.40 28.17 30.25 
Estonia1 13.57 23.34 24.90 
Hungary 22.24 23.14 21.93 
Latvia 19.96 19.40 20.34 
Lithuania 21.89 19.21 22.11 
Poland 15.82 21.54 26.16 
Slovak Republic 27.12 27.18 33.17 
Slovenia 42.66 49.12 48.42 
Notes: 1, 1995 
Source: Calculated on the basis of GDP/Capita in constant 2000 
US$, World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. 
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considered a potential threat to the more developed 
economies. Competition from low-wage countries is 
seen to threaten a race to the bottom in labour and 
social standards and many features of a developmen-
tal state are said to confer an unfair competitive ad-
vantage.
On the global level, these perceived threats informed 
the EU´s strategy of “Managed Globalisation”, which 
is built on the notion that the liberalisation needs to 
be accompanied by regulatory harmonisation. As it 
would improve e.g. labour, safety and environmental 
standards, many EU officials and some scholars in-
terpret harmonisation as a mutually beneficent social 
democratic alternative to the Anglo-Saxon strategy of 
liberalisation tout court (Abdelal & Meunier). The re-
jection of this strategy at the 2003 Cancun ministerial 
meeting of the WTO showed that emerging econo-
mies instead tend to interpret it as an attempt to “kick 
away the ladder.”
The enlargement strategy is informed by much the 
same desire to maximise the EU core countries’ op-
portunities in the new member states and minimise 
the threats from them by means of a mix of liberalis-
ing and regulatory measures.
The most damaging blow to the economic prospects 
of the periphery would seem to be the combination of 
a single currency, the abolition of capital controls and 
the creation of a single market in financial services. 
Since the late 1990s, when the Euro was introduced 
and it became clear that the CEE countries, who gen-
erally fixed their exchange rates to the EU by such 
means as ERM2 membership and currency boards, 
would join the EU shortly, interest rate differentials 
virtually disappeared and substantial capital inflows 
financed large current account deficits. As a result 
GDP growth rates in Europe were higher in the East-
ern periphery and in Spain and Greece until 2007. 
That decade thus seemed to confirm the EU´s con-
viction that economic liberalisation plus the Acquis 
equals convergence.
All this changed since 2008, when the financial sys-
tems of the metropolitan countries came under stress, 
thus confronting the periphery with a sudden drying-
up of capital inflows, not unlike the “sudden stop” cri-
ses that destabilised peripheral countries during the 
classical Gold Standard (Notermans 2012). Countries 
like the Czech and Slovak republics and Hungary, 
where a substantial share of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) had been employed in manufacturing enjoyed 
some protection from sudden stops, whereas in the 
Baltics, Spain and Ireland, where capital inflows fu-
elled real estate booms, the collapse in GDP after 
2008 was on a scale not seen since the Great Depres-
sion. In Greece, instead, the bulk of capital inflows 
had financed the public deficit.
The original aim of introducing the common cur-
rency or fixed exchange rates was to promote struc-
tural reforms by forcing employers and trade unions 
to internalise the effects of wage and price setting 
decisions. But the mere impossibility of devaluation 
proved insufficient to eradicate deeply rooted differ-
ences in industrial relations systems such that fixed 
exchange rates commonly implied real appreciation. 
This effect was greatly strengthened by massive capi-
tal inflows with the result that what was left of po-
tentially competitive export industries was further 
weakened.
While fuelling a speculative boom, adherence to the 
common currency in turn deepened the recession. 
The experience of the pre-1914 gold standard would 
seem to indicate that devaluation and default would 
minimise the costs in terms of GDP for peripheral 
countries confronted with a sudden stop. (McLean 
2006) Adherence to the common currency instead 
dictated a policy of austerity and internal devalua-
tion, which was not only a recipe that prolonged the 
crisis - dramatically so in the Southern Eurozone – 
but also one that could not succeed in the aggregate.
In addition to macroeconomic policies, European 
integration also placed successively tighter limits 
on the use of ITT policies (Scharpf 2002: 648). The 
abolition of capital  controls and the harmonisation 
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of financial markets within the Union made it diffi-
cult for the new Eastern members states to prevent 
western companies from acquiring what might have 
become serious competitors over time (Jacoby 2010: 
418-19). Extensive foreign ownership in manufactur-
ing, in turn, promoted an enclave economy with only 
limited technological and managerial spill overs (El-
lison 2008; Jacoby 2010: 425). Moreover, competition 
between foreign banks in the newly opened up areas 
of Eastern Europe did much to spark consumption 
and real-estate bubbles (Reinert & Kattel 2013: 21). 
Competition policy, although included in the Rome 
Treaties, remained a dead letter as long as creat-
ing national champions formed part of the catch-up 
strategy of countries such as Italy and France. But as 
competition policy was tightened in the wake of the 
SEA such strategies now are no longer permissible, 
including the use of public utilities and public pro-
curement for industrial policy ends. Equally since 
the 1980s, state aid, has come under the province of 
competition policy. Although here the EU can wield 
less power than in the other fields of competition 
policy, crucial elements of “financial repression” such 
as “preferential interest rates and favourable loan 
terms” are now considered inadmissible (Rutkiewicz 
2011: 45). The same applies for most of the instru-
ments that were initially employed, especially in the 
Visegrad countries, to attract foreign investment. In-
dustrial processing zones, for example were outlawed 
by the EU in Hungary. Temporary monopoly conces-
sions in order to increase the incentives for large scale 
FDI were equally ruled incompatible with EU rules 
whereas significant limits were placed on the use of 
tax breaks to attract FDI (Ellison 2008).
Finally, the non-negotiable requirement that new 
members adopt the acquis communtaire in its entire-
ty also served the function of preventing the poorer 
members from deriving an advantage from a “light-
er” regulatory structure. As John O’Brennan (2006: 
133) argued: “The enlargement process would ensure 
that CEE producers would gradually become sub-
sumed into EU regulatory structures, thus ensuring 
that CEE advantages in respect of the costs of inputs 
would dissolve over time.”
Against this array of harmonising measures stands the 
structural policies, which are specifically designed to 
promote the convergence of less developed regions. 
Although being the second largest expenditure item, 
support generally amounts to no more than 2.5% 
of GDP in the new member states and the policy is 
widely criticised for its inefficient management (Bor-
gloh et al 2012). Indeed the EU´s conclusion that the 
major recipients, Spain, Portugal and Greece, suffer 
from serious structural problems testifies to the inef-
ficiency of these policies. Moreover, the reorientation 
of regional policies increasingly comes into conflict 
with classic developmental state strategies. The shift 
to horizontal, as opposed to vertical aid reduces the 
ability to channel support to priority sectors, while 
the concentration of spending on the poorest regions 
makes little sense in the presence of industry cluster-
ing due to external economies of scale.
5. Conclusion
What made the classic liberal view of the world econ-
omy so much more attractive than its mercantilist ri-
val was that the latter could only see a zero-sum game 
whereas Smith, Ricardo and others saw mutual ben-
efits. As Smith (2007: 381) had already pointed out 
in the Wealth of Nations a, country could only ben-
efit from having rich instead of poor neighbours. It is 
paradoxical then that the revival of core parts of the 
liberal economic policy orthodoxy since the 1980s 
should have again enthroned a zero-sum view of eco-
nomic competition between nations. Since the 1980s, 
Europe considers competitiveness and not compara-
tive advantage as the key to success in a global econ-
omy, which implies that economic relations necessar-
ily are cast as a zero-sum game (Krugman 1994). In 
analogy to competition between private companies, 
the countries with the most innovative manufactur-
ing, most favourable tax system or the lowest cost 
structure are expected to thrive whereas the others 
will fall by the wayside. 
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At the latest since 2010 it should be clear that coun-
tries are not companies. Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland had apparently lost out in the race for com-
petitiveness, but unlike a company they could not 
simply be dismantled and the valuable pieces sold off. 
The EU´s short term solution was massive financial 
assistance combined with fiscal austerity while the 
long-term solution is expected to arrive from improv-
ing competitiveness, i.e. radical cost cutting in the 
crisis economies. Thus the EU becomes increasingly 
entangled in a web of contradictions. After all, the al-
leged purpose of insisting on the wholesale export of 
the Acquis to new members, as well as the Managed 
Globalisation strategy, was exactly to prevent a down-
ward race of cost cutting. Moreover, if competitive-
ness decides the economic fate of the periphery its 
recovery must necessarily come at the expenses of the 
core countries. It may be increasingly difficult to con-
vince the electorates of the latter to guarantee billions 
of financial assistance while simultaneously accepting 
that the competitiveness of their economies needs to 
decrease.
In order to exit from this zero-sum trap of low over-
all growth and increasing regional disparities the EU 
will need to a development model that combines a 
rejection of export led-growth in favour of domestic 
sources with the recognition that the lower develop-
ment levels of the periphery justify exemptions from 
the principle of reciprocity. 
Yet, Europe´s fundamental problem may lie much 
deeper than an embrace of dysfunctional economic 
ideas. The 1980s switch towards a neo-liberal mac-
roeconomic strategy that lies at the root of the EU´s 
low growth was not driven by the inherent attractive-
ness of what essentially were pre-Great Depression 
convictions but by the difficulty of controlling distri-
butional struggles in a policy regime where the state 
accepted its macroeconomic responsibility for assur-
ing adequate growth and low unemployment. But a 
policy regime that excluded macroeconomic growth 
strategies for reasons related to the process of interest 
intermediation had no other option but to interpret 
economic success in microeconomic terms of com-
petitiveness. Similarly, as pointed out e.g. by Dani Ro-
drik (1995) East Asian types of developmental strat-
egies require a substantial degree of state autonomy 
relative to societal interest groups in order to prevent 
developmentalism from degenerating into crony 
capitalism. It is doubtful that the current systems of 
interest intermediation in many peripheral member 
states would be able to successfully implement such 
an approach. 
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endnotes
1. Many thanks to Luigi Bonatti and Andrew Martin for challenging comments on an earlier 
version (Notermans 2013).
2. As Hobsbawm (2008:74) pointed out, at the onset of the First World War most of the 
world’s population lived in empires. Despite the intervening age of nation-state building, not 
much had changed then since 1750 when, according to Bayly (2004: 27-8), around 70% of the 
global population lived in empires.
3. Joseph M. Colomer (2007: 65) argues that the claim that European integration is sui generis 
“only means that we are not using a sufficiently broad analytical concept, capable of including 
this case among those with common relevant characteristics. The appropriate concept could be 
that of ‘empire’.”
4. Source: AMECO, Gross domestic product at current market prices per head of population.
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